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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last ten years, practitioners in the field of 
environmental or toxic torts have witnessed an unprecedented sea 
change in the application of federal evidentiary rules pertaining to 
the admission of expert witness testimony.  “Scientific,” “technical,” 
or other “specialized”1 expert evidence has become an indispensable 
element of an injured plaintiff’s proof of causation.  Experts with 
skills in these areas are frequently called upon to draw inferences and 
formulate opinions based on data derived from tests, models and 
peer publications “reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular 
field”2 in order to establish a party’s claims.  Imposing a restrictive 
standard to the admissibility of such expert evidence seriously 
jeopardizes the adversary process by upsetting the balance of power 
between the judiciary and the jury. 
Often a toxic tort plaintiff’s claims may rest, in whole or in part, 
on novel scientific theories which have the power to affect hundreds 
or even thousands of people beyond the individual litigants.3  As a 
result, a judicial decision to exclude expert testimony from a jury’s 
purview not only deprives that specific plaintiff of warranted 
compensation, but has the potential to discourage similarly situated 
individuals from seeking a judicial remedy for their injuries.4  More 
importantly, the absence of corrective action taken as a result of the 
litigation may act to “encourage the continued use of a dangerous 
substance.”5 
 
 1 This paper uses the terms “scientific,” “technical,” or “other specialized 
knowledge” consistent with FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 2 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note. 
 3 See David Bernstein, Comment, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The Expert 
Witness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 117, 118 (1990). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 3-4 (2d ed. 2000). 
 1026 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:1025 
A trial judge’s desire to ban “junk” science from the courtroom6 
is balanced against a plaintiff’s possible need to introduce novel 
scientific expert testimony.  This is not to suggest that “junk” science 
has an appropriate role to play before a jury.  The real issue is 
determining what junk science is, especially during an era of 
constantly evolving scientific developments.  Remember, it was not 
too long ago that the public was led to believe that cigarettes were a 
harmless diversion.7  Arguments were made that research linking 
cigarettes to lung cancer were “junk.”  Similarly, how could asbestos, 
the “miracle product” of the twenties and thirties, be anything but a 
benefit to the world?  It was not until the late seventies that the world 
learned that this “miracle product” was lethal in dust form.8  Again, 
early studies into the diseases mesothelioma and asbestosis would 
have been labeled “junk” science by today’s standards. 
To preserve the character of the adversary system, some 
commentators have suggested that court-appointed experts be 
employed to aid trial judges with little or no scientific background to 
distinguish “junk” science from valid scientific theories and 
methodologies.  This is especially useful for theories that may have 
not yet been subject to “peer review” or are not yet “generally 
accepted” simply as a result of their novelty.9  Practically, court-
appointed experts are not necessarily neutral third parties capable of 
distancing themselves from subtle influences arising from their 
association with courts or judges. 
One suggestion may be to more thoroughly educate trial judges 
on the peculiar causation problems faced by toxic tort plaintiffs since 
strict application of the Daubert factors inevitably renders most 
 
 6 Peter Huber popularized the controversial term “junk science.”  See generally  
PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). See 
also Kenneth J. Chesebro, Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993) 
(challenging Huber’s account of “junk science”); Bert Black et al., Science and the Law 
in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 719-
21, 748-49 (1994). 
 7 Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Products Liability: Cigarettes and Other Tobacco 
Products, 35 A.L.R.5th 541 (1996). 
 8 S. Charles Neill, Comment, The Tower of Babel Revisited: The U.S. Supreme Court 
Decertifies One of the Largest Mass Tort Classes in History, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 793, 798-99 
(1998). 
 9 Judith A. Hasko, Note, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Flexible 
Judicial Screening of Scientific Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 1995 WIS. L. 
REV. 479, 501-04 (drawing on Daubert discretionary factors of “peer review” and 
“generally accepted” in discussing judges’ need to familiarize themselves with 
scientific principles in order to decide preliminary questions on admissibility of 
experts). 
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causation evidence proffered by plaintiffs inadmissible.10  
Furthermore, as set forth infra, a trial judge’s decision on the 
admissibility of expert causation evidence may effectively result in 
dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims without getting to the merits.  This 
result places trial judges in the role of “gate-closers” as opposed to 
“gate-keepers.” 
I.  THE UNIQUE CAUSATION BURDENS FACING A TOXIC TORT 
PLAINTIFF 
As referred to briefly above, extensive studies and research 
conducted by the scientific community conducted over the last fifty 
years have demonstrated to the world that many products people 
commonly come into contact with are actually harmful or even 
deadly.11  In addition to asbestos and cigarettes, other such products 
include lead, Bendectin, DES and Thalidomicide, Agent Orange, 
formaldehyde, pesticides, herbicides, and benzene.12  Many of these 
toxins became the subject of civil lawsuits brought by persons 
exposed to these substances who were suffering from chronic 
illnesses or diseases, or the families of those who had died as a result 
of their exposure.13 
A “toxic tort” is a personal injury or related harm attributable to 
a plaintiff’s exposure to a toxic substance.14  The plaintiff’s exposure 
 
 10 See Laurie Alberts, Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: “Which Way Do We Go, 
Judge?”, 12 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 61 (2001). 
 11 Examples include the studies of Louis Lewin, a German toxicologist, on the 
chronic toxicity of narcotics and other alkoids; research done by E.M. Geilling which 
explained the mechanism of toxicity for sulfanilamide and ethylene (chemicals 
which had previously been used in medications to treat various bacterial diseases, but 
resulted in several deaths from renal failure); the discovery that DDT and phenoxy 
herbicides, originally used as agricultural poisons or pesticides had the potential to 
kill or significantly injure humans; the revelation that the drug Thalidomide taken 
during pregnancy resulted in grotesque deformities to children borne by mothers 
who ingested the substance.  By the mid-nineties, there were more than 120 scholarly 
journals devoted to toxicology, risk assessment, risk management, and other related 
fields.  See Christopher H. Buckley Jr. & Charley H. Haake, Separating the Scientist’s 
Wheat From the Charlatan’s Chaff: Daubert’s Role in Toxic Tort Litigation, 28 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10293 (1998). 
 12 M. Neil Browne et al., The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 
36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2 n.14 (1998). 
 13 See, e.g., Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance Company, 52 
P.3d 79, 83 (Cal. 2002). 
 14 Dorothea M. Capone, The Unique Causation Burdens Facing the Toxic Tort Plaintiff 
- An Argument for Application of the Substantial Factor Test, 17 N.Y. ENVTL. LAW. 22 
(1997); see also Christopher L. Callahan, Establishment of Causation in Toxic Tort 
Litigation, Symposium on Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605 
(1991). 
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can rarely be attributed to a single exposure event, but more typically 
arises out of chronic and repeated exposures.15  The injury suffered 
by the plaintiff is ordinarily not traumatic, but instead, may develop 
slowly over several decades following the exposure.16  Evidence may 
not be immediately apparent.17  Rather, the injury may be in the form 
of a syndrome, or a terminal disease which remains latent and 
undetected for many years.18  Even more rare is a toxic exposure 
unequivocally linked to a particular disease or illness in the way 
mesothelioma has been conclusively traced to asbestos exposure, or 
angiosarcoma’s undeniable link to vinyl chloride.  Unlike these 
illnesses, many cancers and diseases do not manifest themselves with 
any physical evidence of their causative agents.19  Add to these 
problems an individual’s physical idiosyncrasies, genetic make-up, 
and personal medical history and one can see how it may be virtually 
impossible for a plaintiff to establish causation for their injuries to a 
certainty.20 
To hold a negligent tortfeasor liable for damages, a plaintiff 
must establish the following four traditional elements of negligence: 
(1) a legal duty or obligation; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a 
proximate cause connection between the breach and the plaintiff’s 
injury; and (4) an actual loss or injury to the plaintiff.21  Tort law 
requires a court to find both cause-in-fact and proximate cause 
before imposing liability on a defendant.22  A plaintiff can generally 
 
 15 David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 855-56 (1984). 
 16 Paul K. Sidorenko, Evidentiary Dilemmas in Establishing Causation: Are Courts 
Capable of Adjudicating Toxic Torts?, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 441, 444 (1990).  See, e.g., 
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 517-19 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) (discussing problems associated with latent 
manifestation of toxic injuries).  See also Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 
585, 525 A.2d 287, 301 (1987) (extended latency period is frequently referred to as 
one of the primary difficulties encountered by plaintiffs trying to provide causation 
in a toxic tort action). 
 17 Neill, supra note 8, at 799. 
 18 Patricia E. Lin, Opening the Gates to Scientific Evidence in Toxic Exposure Cases: 
Medical Monitoring and Daubert, 17 REV. LITIG. 551, 552 (1998) (discussing the nature 
of toxic torts); see also Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, 
Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986). 
 19 Gold, supra note 18, at 379. 
 20 Id.; see also Browne et al., supra note 12, at 3 (causation cannot be established to 
certainty); Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 431 P.2d 794 (1967) (plaintiff failed to 
conclusively demonstrate that uranium mining caused her decedent’s cancer, even 
though higher than average rate of cancer existed among uranium miners). 
 21 W. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 
(5th ed. 1984). 
 22 Id. § 41 at 263. 
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satisfy the law’s cause-in-fact requirement by proving that “but for” 
the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would not have been injured.23  
The proximate cause prong of a plaintiff’s claim can be satisfied 
when a sufficient link is established between the tortfeasor’s negligent 
conduct and the plaintiff’s injury so as to justify the imposition of 
liability on that defendant.24 
Following this relatively simple analysis, it is apparent that 
requiring a toxic tort plaintiff who suffered serious injury or death 
after exposure to a toxin to establish “but for” certainty under 
traditional causation standards is neither fair nor practical, since 
there is likely to be little or no direct evidence of causation.  To 
demonstrate a causal link between his or her injury and the toxic 
substance within a defendant’s control, a toxic tort plaintiff is forced 
to rely on indirect evidence and the opinions of experts in such fields 
as epidemiology and toxicology.25 
Rather than applying the rigid “but for” analysis in a toxic tort 
action, it is more appropriate, and certainly more equitable, for a 
court to determine “whether a reasonable link exists between a 
plaintiff’s injur[y] and the defendant’s conduct” such that the court 
may impose liability on the defendant.26  This approach was first 
suggested in a toxic tort context by the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah in Allen v. United States.27  The trial judge in 
Allen argued that in order to satisfy public policy concerns underlying 
the tort doctrine, prior to a finding on the issues of duty or breach, 
the toxic tort plaintiff should only be required to establish that there 
was a “factual connection” between the injury suffered and the 
defendant’s conduct.28  If the plaintiff can prove the defendant 
engaged in conduct which created a risk of injury, and if the 
plaintiff’s injuries are consistent with that risk, a seemingly exclusive 
factual connection has been created sufficient to hold the defendant 
 
 23 Id. at 265-66. 
 24 See Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314-15 (1980) (stating that 
a case can go to the jury only after a court has determined that proximate cause 
exists). 
 25 See Capone, supra note 14, at 23; see also Palma J. Strand, The Inapplicability of 
Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution 
Victim Compensation, 35 STAN L. REV. 575, 577 (1983). 
 26 See Capone, supra note 14, at 23. 
 27 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984). 
 28 Id. at 404-05; see also E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause 
and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 5 
(“[I]f plaintiff cannot establish a cause-in-fact that will support liability . . . plaintiff 
should attempt to establish the most exclusive factual connection that he can 
between his injury and the defendant.”). 
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responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries.29 
Moreover, while the “but for” rule is easily applied in simple tort 
negligence actions involving a single defendant, it fails miserably in 
situations where two or more forces join together and result in an 
injury to a plaintiff where either of them operating alone would have 
been sufficient to cause the plaintiff’s injuries.30  Under such a 
scenario, where the negligence of each of the actors prevents the 
other from being a “but-for” cause, some courts have recognized each 
actor’s negligent act or omission to be a substantial factor in bringing 
about the plaintiff’s injury, allowing each to be held responsible for 
the harm inflicted upon the plaintiff.31 
Requiring a reasonable link between a plaintiff’s injury and a 
defendant’s negligent conduct allows a court to more carefully assess 
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding a complained-of 
exposure to determine whether it is reasonable to conclude that the 
defendant’s behavior was a substantial factor in bringing about the 
plaintiff’s injury.  Applying this analysis, a plaintiff will be capable of 
establishing causation through the introduction of indirect and 
expert testimony.  From a public policy perspective, substituting the 
substantial factor test for the rigid and seemingly insurmountable 
“but for” test makes it more likely that a negligent defendant will be 
held responsible for the harm, and future wrongful conduct will be 
deterred.32 
II.  THE SPECIAL NEED FOR EXPERT WITNESSES IN TOXIC TORT 
LITIGATION 
An expert witness is a person, who by his or her knowledge, skill, 
experience or training in a specific area has acquired a specialized 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge which may “assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue.”33  Because toxic tort litigation involves complex scientific 
issues, particularly with respect to causation, plaintiffs are required to 
rely on the testimony of experts to establish exposure to the toxic 
substance, describe the nature of the plaintiff’s injury, and link the 
 
 29 Thode, supra note 28, at 6. 
 30 PROSSER ET AL., supra note21, §41 at 266; see also Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 
416 F.2d 417, 429 (2d  Cir. 1969) (stating that the use of but-for analysis where more 
than one likely cause exists is wholly inadequate). 
 31 See Rory A. Valas, Toxic Palsgraf: Proving Causation When the Link Between Conduct 
and Injury Appears Highly Extraordinary, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 775 (1991). 
 32 See Capone, supra note 14, at 23. 
 33 See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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exposure to the injury.34 
As stated previously, it may be practically impossible for a toxic 
tort plaintiff to demonstrate to a certainty that a particular substance 
caused his or her injury.  However, the corollary may be just as true: it 
may be equally impossible for a defendant to establish that the 
particular substance did not cause the plaintiff’s injury.35  To 
overcome this obstacle, a plaintiff must turn to “probabilistic” 
evidence to establish causation.36 
A court will require that a plaintiff establish two types of 
causation: general and specific.37  Courts are in general agreement 
that “[g]eneral causation addresses whether products of the same 
nature as [a] defendant’s products are capable of causing the type of 
injuries alleged . . . [while] specific causation addresses whether [a] 
defendant’s product more likely than not caused injuries in the 
particular case.”38  Specific causation, therefore, requires a toxic tort 
plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
 
 34 McElveen, The Use of Experts in Toxic Tort Litigation, in TOXIC TORTS 532-35 (G. 
Nothstein ed., 1984). 
 35 See Buckley & Haake, supra note 11 (discussing the significant role expert 
testimony plays in a toxic tort action). 
 36 See id. (discussing the requirement that plaintiffs must use “probabilistic” 
evidence to establish causation). 
 37 See Heller v. Shaw Indus. (Heller I), No. CIV.A.95-7657,1997 WL 535163 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 18, 1997) (Mem.) (discussing general and specific causation), aff’d 167 F.3d 
146 (3d Cir. 1999).  See also Buckley & Haake, supra note 11 (quoting Mancuso v. 
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1437, 1445-46 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997), stating: 
[The causation method] requires first that the expert determine the 
dosage of the toxin at issue to which the plaintiff was exposed . . . .  
Second, the expert must establish “general causation” by 
demonstrating that, according to scientific literature, levels of the toxin 
comparable to those received by the plaintiff can cause the specific 
types of injuries he alleges . . . .  Third, the expert must establish 
specific causation by demonstrating that, more likely than not, the 
toxic caused the plaintiff’s injuries in a particular case. 
See also Ellen Relkin, The Sword or the Shield: Use of Commercial Regulations, Exposure 
Standards and Toxicological Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 
2-3 (1997) (discussing general and specific causation and exposure levels of toxic 
substances). 
 38 See Heller I, 1997 WL 535163 at *6 (Mem) (citing Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. 
Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D.N.J. 1996), aff’d, 118 F.3d 1577, 1997 U.S. App. 
LEXIS (3rd Cir. 1997)); Mascarenas v. Miles, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 582, 587-88 (W.D. 
Mo. 1997) (discussing causation requirements).  See generally Wright v. Williamette 
Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1996) (requiring proof of exposure to toxic 
substance at levels known to cause injuries); In re Paoli R.R. PCB Yard Litig., 916 F.2d 
829, 833 (3d Cir. 1990) (requiring exposure as element in toxic tort case); Maddy v. 
Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1533 (Kan. 1990) (discussing need for 
plaintiff to demonstrate she was exposed to harmful substance). 
 1032 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:1025 
defendant permitted a toxic substance to be released, that the 
plaintiff was exposed to the released toxic substance, that an injury 
occurred, and the injury was caused by the toxic substance released 
by the defendant.39  Taking this analysis to its logical conclusion, a 
toxic tort plaintiff must prove that he or she was exposed to toxins 
produced by the defendant at levels which exceed normal 
background levels, and that the duration and dosage of the exposure 
were at levels significantly likely to cause injury to humans.40 
Probabilistic evidence includes both epidemiological and 
toxicological studies.41  Toxicological studies rely on actual tests 
usually involving animals to determine a specific chemical’s capacity 
to cause harm or injury.42  Accordingly, since the results are 
extrapolated, toxicological tests may inaccurately report the toxin’s 
effect on humans.43  Additionally, since toxicological studies are 
generally performed under controlled laboratory conditions, it is 
virtually impossible to duplicate the exact environments where 
exposures might occur, especially in situations involving low level 
exposures over an extended period of time.44 
Epidemiology is the study of incidence, determinants, 
distribution, and control of a disease within a population that focuses 
on the patterns and factors relating to a disease, rather than the 
actual cause.45  Epidemiological studies can be an indispensable tool 
for a plaintiff trying to establish causation in the absence of direct or 
particularistic evidence.46  These studies seek to demonstrate a strong 
 
 39 See Buckley & Haake, supra note 11 (outlining general and specific causation). 
 40 See Heller I, 1997 WL 535163, at *6 (Mem) (citing Mateer v. U.S. Aluminum, 
No. CIV.A.88-2147, 1989 WL 60442, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 1989)). 
 41 See Gold, supra note 18, at 384. 
 42 See Pier et al., Recognition and Evaluation of Hazards, in TOXIC TORTS 2 (G. 
Nothstein ed., 1984).  As of the late 1990s, there were approximately five million 
organic chemicals and five hundred thousand inorganic substances known to exist, 
with approximately ten thousand more being synthesized each year.  More than 
63,000 chemicals are commonly used in industry, with about 1,000 newly developed 
substances entering the consumer market each year.  Only a fraction of these 
chemical have been tested for their toxicological effects, and neither industry nor 
the government produce information regarding the toxicity of these chemicals 
unless they are statutorily required to do so.  Id.  For instance, the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1986), requires manufacturers of 
specified chemicals to meet certain reporting requirements which include publishing 
the results of tests on those specified chemicals to determine their effects.  The TSCA 
does not, however, require unspecified chemicals to meet reporting requirements. 
 43 Pier et al., supra note 42, at 3. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See generally G. FRIEDMAN, PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (2d ed. 1980). 
 46 See In re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128 
(1995); see also Agent Orange Opt Out Opinion, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 
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and statistically significant relationship between the substances to 
which a plaintiff was exposed and the injury a plaintiff has suffered.47 
In Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc.,48 the plaintiff brought a 
wrongful death action against a tampon manufacturer alleging that 
his wife died as a result of contracting toxic shock syndrome after 
using a tampon manufactured by the defendant.49  As proof of 
causation, the plaintiff sought to introduce epidemiological studies 
conducted by the Federal Center for Disease Control and the 
Wisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa State health departments, all of 
which showed a statistical link between the use of a tampon and the 
disease.50  The district court refused to admit the studies claiming 
they lacked reliability under the Federal Rules of Evidence.51  On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling, holding 
that the defendant failed to meet its burden of showing that the 
methodologies of these epidemiological studies were flawed and 
therefore incapable of sustaining the plaintiff’s causation burden.52 
Unfortunately, many courts have tacked in the opposite 
direction and have concluded that since epidemiological and 
toxicological studies are inherently incapable of establishing 
causation to a certainty, the information contained in these studies 
must be excluded from the jury’s consideration.  This result unfairly 
prejudices the innocent victim.53 
In light of the unique problems associated with demonstrating 
causation to a certainty in a toxic tort action, many commentators 
have observed that the success or failure of a plaintiff’s case actually 
hinges on the expert testimony.54  Tragically, changes in federal 
 
1985), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988) (holding 
that epidemiological studies of exposed population were the “only useful studies 
having any bearing on causation”). 
 47 See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (allowing 
epidemiological evidence of asbestos workers to establish a risk of asbestos 
exposure); see also American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(epidemiological evidence permitted to establish health risk of coke oven emissions). 
 48 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 49 Id. at 296. 
 50 Id. at 299. 
 51 Id. at 300. 
 52 Id. at 303. 
 53 See, e.g., Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420 (E.D. Tex. 1986), aff’d, 
826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant 
where plaintiff failed to supply epidemiological or other admissible evidence to 
support allegation that plaintiff’s use of defendant’s herbicide caused alleged 
injuries). 
 54 Cynthia H. Cwik, Guarding the Gate: Expert Evidence Admissibility, 25 A.B.A. J. SEC. 
LITIG. 6 (Summer 1999). 
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evidentiary admissibility standards over the last ten years have 
resulted in trial judges as “gate-keepers” unnecessarily excluding 
toxic tort plaintiffs’ scientific expert testimony under standards that 
almost invariably sound the “death knell for a plaintiff’s cause of 
action.”55 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT WITNESS 
EVIDENCE 
Long before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, the 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia in Frye v. United States56 represented the common law 
standard for determining the admissibility of scientific expert 
testimony.  At issue in the case was whether the systolic blood 
pressure deception test (a precursor to the present-day lie detector 
test) should be admissible in a criminal trial.57  Establishing what is 
commonly referred to as the “general acceptance” test, the court held 
scientific testimony to be inadmissible unless the expert’s 
methodology is accepted in the general community of scientists.58  
Since at the time of the decision, the lie detector test had not 
reached a level of general acceptance within the scientific 
community, the court ruled that the tests conducted on the 
defendant were inadmissible.59  Under the Frye test, a court was not 
required to examine the reliability of an expert’s testimony.  Instead, 
courts looked to the general community of scientists in the particular 
field to see if there was substantial agreement that the methodology 
employed was sound. 
The “general acceptance test” survived for decades and many 
courts relied on its reasoning to determine the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.60  Over the next seventy years, an onslaught of 
scientific and technological advances exploded into courtrooms 
across the country.  The holding of Frye came under fire for failing to 
offer specific guidelines for ascertaining when a scientific principle 
becomes generally accepted.61 
 
 55 Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, Wither Daubert? Reliable Resolution of Scientifically-
Based Causality Issues in Toxic Tort Cases, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 567 (1998). 
 56 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 1014. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 869 F.3d 348 (7th Cir. 1989) (spectrograms); 
Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989) 
(fiber analysis); United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1984) (psychiatry). 
 61 See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C. Cir. 
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The Rules of Evidence (“Rules”) were adopted in the 1970s, and 
included provisions addressing the admissibility of evidence 
generally, as well as specific references for the introduction of expert 
testimony.62  The general thrust of the Rules is simple—”all relevant 
evidence is admissible.”63  Nowhere do the Rules specify a standard of 
admissibility for scientific studies or expert opinions.  Instead, Rule 
702 specifically provides that: 
[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliable to the facts of the case.64 
In 1993, the Supreme Court, in the seminal case Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,65 held that the Frye “general 
acceptance test” was contrary to the “liberal thrust” of the Federal 
Rules, which were intended to lower barriers to the admission of 
expert testimony.66  Additionally, the Court sought to create a 
uniform standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence focused 
on the issue of scientific validity.67  In its ruling, the Court directed 
that trial judges, pursuant to Rule 104(a),68 would determine whether 
the proffered expert evidence is “(1) scientific knowledge that (2) 
 
1988) (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984)). 
 62 FED. R. EVID. 401 & 701-02. 
 63 See FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 64 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 65 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  Jason Daubert and Eric Schuler both suffered from limb 
reduction birth defects following their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin, a popular 
morning sickness drug during each of their pregnancies.  Id. at 579.  Actions were 
brought against the drug’s manufacturer, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, claiming 
that Bendectin caused the plaintiffs’ birth defects.  Id.  The trial judge granted 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989), and 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), holding the plaintiffs’ 
expert testimony inadmissible because its underlying methodology was not generally 
accepted in the scientific community. 
 66 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. 
 67 Daubert is centered on the idea of scientific validity.  See MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 1-45 (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997); see also Black, supra note 6; Joseph 
Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REV. 
1387, 1390 (1994). 
 68 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  This rule governs preliminary questions of 
admissibility: “[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be 
a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be 
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).”  Id. 
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will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine the facts in 
issue.”69 
Daubert set up a two-prong test to guide trial judges in their gate-
keeping role.  First, judges must make a “preliminary assessment of 
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid” [i.e., “reliable”].70  Second, they must determine 
“whether that reasoning or methodology can be applied properly to 
the facts at issue”71 (i.e., whether the expert testimony “fits” the issue 
to which he or she is testifying).72  The proffered expert evidence 
must satisfy both prongs of the Court’s test to be admissible.73 
The Court went on to set out four discretionary factors to assist a 
trial judge in determining whether the proffered expert evidence is 
sufficiently reliable such that it may be considered by the ultimate 
trier of fact, i.e., the jury.  The factors are as follows: (1) whether the 
technique or theory underlying the proffered testimony can be tested 
(i.e. “falsifiability”); (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review 
and publication; (3) whether it has been generally accepted in the 
scientific community; and (4) whether it has “a known or potential 
rate of error.”74  On remand, the Ninth Circuit introduced a fifth 
factor75 that a trial judge may take into consideration: whether the 
expert proposes to testify about matters “growing naturally and 
directly out of research they have conducted independent of 
litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly 
for purposes of testifying.”76 
It is important to note that while Daubert changed the 
 
 69 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
 70 Id. at 580. 
 71 Id. at 592-93. 
 72 Id. at 591.  Several “fit” analyses in the years since the Daubert decision have 
excluded testimony because the trial judge concluded that the evidence available to 
the expert did not address the particular disputed fact questions posed by the case, 
i.e., there was no “fit” between the data and the conclusions the expert wished to 
draw.  See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743 (3rd Cir. 1994) 
(simply too great a “gap” between the data and the opinion offered). 
 73 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92. 
 74 Id. at 593-94. 
 75 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 76 Id.; see also Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 
1997) (inquiring whether the expert “is being as careful as he would be in his regular 
professional work outside of his paid litigation consulting”); Allison v. McGhan Med. 
Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999) (excluding an expert rheumatologist’s opinion 
testimony as it was prepared for litigation); Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 137 F. Supp. 2d 147, 190 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that experts’ methodology 
was not reliable because each expert developed their hypothesis during course of 
litigation and did not share same with peers). 
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admissibility standard for scientific expert evidence, the Court 
expressly stated that the “inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is a ‘flexible 
one’”77 and pointed out that the focus of the trial judge “must be 
solely on principles and methodology, not the conclusions they 
generate.”78  Despite this mandate, defendants continue to raise 
Daubert challenges that seek to have trial judges, acting as gate-
keepers, exclude expert scientific testimony on the basis of the 
conclusions reached.79  Such actions fly in the face of the express 
instruction from the Justices that “[v]igorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the 
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of 
satisfying shaky but admissible evidence.”80 
Following Daubert, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
decide the appropriate standard of appellate review for a trial court’s 
ruling on the admissibility of expert evidence.  In Joiner v. General 
Electric,81 the district court found that there was no evidence to 
conclude that the plaintiff was either exposed to polychlorinated 
biphenyls (“PCBs”) or that the exposure to PCBs was linked to the 
plaintiff’s lung cancer.82  Following the direction taken by the Third 
Circuit in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation,83 which took a “hard 
look” at the trial court’s exclusion of evidence, the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed the district court, applying a stringent standard of review.84  
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and 
held “[i]n applying an overly ‘stringent’ review to [the district 
court’s] ruling, [the Eleventh Circuit] failed to give the trial court the 
deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion review.”85  The 
Court went on to hold that whether the excluded evidence was 
“outcome determinative” was irrelevant to the question of standard of 
review.86 
The abuse-of-discretion standard of review established by Joiner 
 
 77 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 78 Id. at 594-95. 
 79 The Third Circuit embraced the Supreme Court’s admonitions in Heller v. 
Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 1999), where it found “an expert 
opinion must be based upon reliable methodology and must reliably flow from that 
methodology and the facts at issue—but it need not be so persuasive as to meet a 
party’s burden of proof or even necessarily its burden of production.” 
 80 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)). 
 81 864 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
 82 Id. 
 83 33 F.3d 716, 749–50 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 84 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 85 General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997). 
 86 Id at 142-43. 
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has particular significance for plaintiffs litigating toxic tort actions.  
Typically, defense counsel seeking to exclude a plaintiff’s proffered 
expert testimony will simultaneously move for summary judgment 
because if they are successful and the evidence is excluded, the 
plaintiff will not be able to establish causation.  From a practical 
perspective, when this occurs, a plaintiff’s ability to challenge the trial 
court’s ruling on appeal often becomes a meaningless right. 
Following the Joiner decision, lower courts were split on how, or 
even whether, Daubert applied to non-scientific expert evidence, 
which nevertheless could be characterized as “technical” or “other 
specialized”87 knowledge.88  The Supreme Court resolved this split in 
1999 in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,89 anecdotably referred to as the 
final case in the Daubert trilogy. 
In Kumho Tire, the Court held “that Daubert’s general holding—
setting forth the trial judge’s general ‘gate keeping’ obligation—
applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also 
to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ 
knowledge.”90  The Court reiterated that a trial judge may consider 
one or more of the Daubert discretionary factors when it will help 
determine the expert’s reliability.91  Writing for the unanimous Court, 
Justice Breyer reaffirmed the “flexibility” of the Daubert test92 and 
stated that “Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor 
exclusively”93 applies to all expert evidence because “[l]ife and the 
legal cases it generates are too complex to warrant so definitive a 
match.”94 
 
 87 See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 88 See, e.g., Talkington v. Atria Reclameluficers Febriken B.V., 152 F.3d 254, 265 
(4th Cir. 1998) (finding Daubert inquiry inapplicable because electrical engineer 
claimed to rely on training and expertise and not any particular methodology); 
Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F.2d 915, 920 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(whether Daubert factors applicable to expert hinges on manner in which expert’s 
testimony is presented to the jury).  Courts where Daubert was held inapplicable to 
purported non-scientific evidence include: Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 
990 (5th Cir. 1997) (Daubert factors do necessarily apply to engineering principles 
and practice experience); Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (Daubert factors are unwarranted in cases where expert testimony is based 
solely on experience or training); Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51 (2nd 
Cir. 1993) (Daubert factors are inapplicable to testimony based on payroll review 
prepared by accountant). 
 89 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 90 Id. at 141 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 93 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
 94 Id. at 151. 
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In response to the Supreme Court’s Daubert trilogy, Congress 
amended Rule 702 in 2000.95  By amending the rule, Congress 
affirmed “the trial court’s role as gate-keeper” and stated “that all 
types of expert testimony present questions of admissibility for the 
trial court in deciding whether the evidence is reliable and helpful.”96  
According to the Advisory Committee notes, however, the 
amendment is “not intended to provide an excuse for an automatic 
challenge to the testimony of every expert.”  Instead, the trial judge 
has the discretion to avoid unnecessary “reliability” proceedings in 
cases where the “reliability of an expert’s method is properly taken 
for granted.”97 
IV.  CRITICISMS TO THE WHOLESALE ALTERATION OF ADMISSIBILITY 
STANDARDS PERTAINING TO EXPERT EVIDENCE 
“Implicit[] in the Daubert line of cases” is an assumption that trial 
judges have the skills necessary “to understand and interpret expert 
evidence, or at least they have-possess better skills than six or twelve” 
jurors.98  Jurors are frequently maligned as intellectual incompetents 
who rely on superficial characteristics of experts in judging their 
testimony, or “abdicate their responsibility to evaluate [an expert’s] 
testimony” altogether because they are simply too confused.99  When 
it comes to evaluating complicated scientific data derived from the 
fields of epidemiology, toxicology, and chemistry, however, studies 
demonstrate that the average trial judge is certainly no better 
qualified than members of a jury.100 
The most common criticism of the Supreme Court’s wholesale 
alteration of expert admissibility standards in Daubert is that it forces 
trial judges to become amateur scientists in order to meet their gate-
keeping responsibilities.101  Others have expressed concern over the 
potential for science to overwhelm a trial judge, resulting in a “blind 
 
 95 See FED. R. EVID 702 advisory committee’s note at 687 & 690; see also David M. 
Maole & Paul J. Zwier, Epistemology After Daubert, Kumho Tire and the New Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 103 (2001). 
 96 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note at 687 & 690. 
 97 Id. at 688. 
 98 Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Jury in the Twenty-First Century: An 
Interdisciplinary Conference Article: Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 
1167 (2001). 
 99 Id. at 1126. 
 100 Id. at 1169. 
 101 Mark Parascandola, What is Wrong with the Probability of Causation?, 39 
JURIMETRICS J. 29, 44 (1998) (“Any mechanism to keep “junk science” out of the 
courtroom is only as good as those watching over it.”). 
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application” of the gate-keeper responsibilities.102  Finally, some 
commentators have concluded that a dangerous precedent is set 
when “judges must pit themselves against scientists who are testifying 
as experts in their fields.”103 
While there is little research data in the area, studies suggest that 
the ability of judges and jurors to make correct inferences from 
probability data are both poor, and specifically, that the judges are 
not superior to jurors.104  A panel of the National Research Council 
also performed a series of case studies which demonstrated that 
judges frequently misinterpret statistical information.105 
The most compelling data, however, comes from a recent study 
involving 400 state court trial judges from all fifty states whose 
dockets were likely to include Daubert type evidence.106  A detailed 
survey was developed consisting of two parts.  The first part focused 
on the admissibility standards in the individual judge’s state, his or 
her perception of the appropriateness and value of the Daubert 
standards, additional perception questions concerning the 
functioning of the legal system, and the individual judge’s definition 
of types of expert testimony as “scientific” or as “technical or 
otherwise specialized knowledge.”107  The second part of the survey 
focused on the trial judge’s level of experience with specific types of 
scientific evidence and his or her techniques for managing scientific 
evidence.  A particularly critical aspect of the survey assessed the 
judge’s understanding of the Daubert factors, specifically, testing and 
falsifiability, error rates, peer review and publication, and general 
acceptance of the scientific community.  Each judge was asked to 
explain his or her understanding of each criterion and how they 
would apply a specific factor.108 
The study found that few of the judges had little experience with 
epidemiological evidence, and 73% reported they had no experience 
at all.  A startling 96% of the judges surveyed reported that they 
 
 102 Id. 
 103 Samuel H. Jackson, Technical Advisors Deserve Equal Billing with Court Appointed 
Experts in Novel and Complex Scientific Cases: Does the Federal Judicial Center Agree?, 28 
ENVTL. L. 431, 436 (1998). 
 104 See Gary Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability 
Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992). 
 105 See generally THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE 
COURTS (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989). 
 106 See Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: Results of a National Survey of 
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 
(2001). 
 107 See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 108 See Gatowski supra note 106. 
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received no instruction about general scientific methods and 
principles.  As concerns the Daubert factors, only 4% could provide an 
explanation that demonstrated a clear understanding of the testing 
and falsifiability factor; while a startling 35% of the judges gave 
answers which were unequivocally wrong.  Similarly, only 4% 
demonstrated a clear understanding of “error rate,” 86% gave 
answers best classified as equivocal, and 10% gave clearly wrong 
answers.  Concerning peer review, the majority of the judges clearly 
understood the concept, while 10% clearly did not.109 
These judicial deficiencies and the results of other research 
studies are extremely significant since the Daubert factors of 
falsifiability and error rates are frequently a critical aspect of a trial 
judge’s evaluation of the validity of an expert’s scientific opinion.110  
The data in these research studies and surveys suggest that claims of 
judicial superiority versus juror inferiority in assessing scientific 
evidence are unfounded, and, at their worst, may be potentially 
wrong.  There is simply “no evidence that juries are incompetent to 
evaluate expert testimony” or that if permitted to review all expert 
evidence available to both sides, that there is a greater potential for 
unsupported, exorbitant damage verdicts.111  When faced with the 
task of evaluating any evidence outside of their common knowledge, 
jurors rely on common sense to assess the completeness and 
consistency of the testimony and evaluate the evidence against their 
knowledge in related matters.112 
More likely, the difficulties faced by jurors lie in the manner in 
which the scientific information is presented,113 and do not involve 
their ability to understand the information.114  Lawyers must give 
 
 109 Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 98, at 1172-73 (interpreting Gatowski, supra 
note 106). 
 110 Vidmar & Diamond, supra, note 98, at 1173. 
 111 Id. at 1175. 
 112 See Sanja Ivkovich & Valerie Hans, Jurors and Experts, 16 ADVOCATE: THE 
MAGAZINE FOR DELAWARE TRIAL LAWYERS 17, 20 (1994). 
 113 Some researchers have found some indication that jurors have trouble with 
some complex scientific expert testimony.  They noted that the reason for this 
difficulty may be the limits placed on jurors by the adversarial process which forces 
them to operate under less than optimal circumstances including confusing 
presentation of factual and legal issues “and other needless impediments to their 
fact-finding task.”  See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons 
from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 765 (1991). 
 114 Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 98, at 1176; Cecil, supra note 113, at 750-63; 
JOE S. CECIL ET AL., JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS 38 (1987); Neil Vidmar, Are 
Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific/Medical Issues? Some 
Data From Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 903-06 (1994) (reviewing studies to 
assess the degree to which jury verdicts agree with those of experts independently 
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greater attention to preparing witnesses “to provide more concrete, 
albeit necessarily accurate, analogues, models, and metaphors to 
assist lay persons in grasping complex concepts.”115  In addition, jury 
instructions should be written more clearly to increase juror 
comprehension.  Some commentators have posited that procedural 
modifications, such as providing jurors with a written synopsis of an 
expert’s opinion prior to his or her testimony, may aid jurors in their 
role as the ultimate triers-of-fact.116  Others have suggested that 
opposing experts should testify back-to-back rather than following the 
traditional adversary system of each side presenting its own case 
separately.  This practice would enable jurors to more easily compare 
and evaluate the experts’ testimony.117  For example, Arizona has 
instituted a number of procedural reforms that allow jurors to ask 
questions of witnesses by communicating their request to the judge in 
writing, and permitting jurors to discuss evidence during breaks and 
at other times instead of being forced to remain silent on the issues 
until deliberations.118  Some data collected by researchers indicates 
that jurors often have questions about expert testimony such as the 
clarification of terminology, procedures used by experts to arrive at 
their conclusions, and the validity of the expert’s inferences from the 
data studied.119 
Even more chilling is the erosive effect the trial court’s role as 
gate-keeper is having on the adversary system.  The adversary process, 
the jury, “and the law of evidence are closely bound together” and 
“[w]hat happens to one inevitably affects the other two.”120  Each has 
 
assessing the evidence presented in malpractice cases); Mark I. Taragin et al., The 
Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice 
Claims, 117 ANNALS OF INTERNAL. MED. 780 (1992) (comparing jury verdicts on 
liability against the judgment of negligence made by insurance company’s physician 
evaluator); Special Comm. A.B.A. Sec. Litig., Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases 
(1989) (including interviews with judges, lawyers and juries after trials involving 
sexual harassment, antitrust, insurance fraud, and misappropriation of trade secrets). 
 115 Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 98, at 1178; see also JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN 
ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 91 (1998).  See generally AMIRAM EL WORK 
ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982), Robert P. Charrow & 
Beda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury 
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, 
What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & 
L. 589 (1997). 
 116 See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 98, at 1179-80. 
 117 JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997). 
 118 See generally Paula Hannaford et al., Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: 
Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 359 (2000). 
 119 Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 98, at 1180. 
 120 Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial By Jury, and the Erosion of the 
Adversarial Process, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 356 (1998). 
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been “buffeted by changes in the American legal landscape” and each 
is affected by factors such as increasing docket pressures and the 
mounting costs associated with jury trials.121 
Moreover, trial judges traditionally function as impartial 
arbitrators between disputing parties in civil cases.122  The Daubert 
changes to the evidentiary rules of admissibility have effectively 
weakened the parties’ control over litigation (and in the particular 
context of a toxic tort action, it has all but destroyed the injured 
party’s ability to control the outcome), and eliminated the trial 
judge’s “neutrality” by empowering them to exclude critical evidence 
from the jury’s consideration, fundamentally altering the adversary 
system.  A fair interpretation of these realities suggests that the 
Supreme Court has chosen to trade judicial impartiality and the 
traditional adversary system for cost reductions, reduced calendar 
loads and an increasingly politicized judiciary managing cases in a 
way that erodes the average citizen’s belief that the courts serve as 
their last chance for “equal justice.” 
CONCLUSION 
A careful reading of the Daubert trilogy and its progeny makes 
clear that the Supreme Court intended to open the gates and 
liberalize admissibility standards when it will aid the trier of fact.  The 
Court has encouraged trial courts to err on the side of admissibility 
based on trust that the adversarial process resolves admissibility 
problems through the use of “vigorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the 
burden of proof” to attack “shaky but admissible evidence.”123  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence have been amended to codify the Court’s 
intent.124 
Unfortunately, the practical effect of the Court’s decisions are 
having just the opposite affect.  The gates are quietly being closed; 
some might even say slammed in the faces of toxic tort and other 
plaintiffs.  District courts find seemingly innocuous reasons to 
routinely prohibit a plaintiff’s proffered expert testimony from ever 
reaching a jury, oftentimes completely dismissing actions.  In light of 
the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, their decisions are rarely 
 
 121 Id. (citing MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 142 (1997)). 
 122 See Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(comparing the roles of judges and arbitrators). 
 123 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)). 
 124 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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overturned.125 
Some subtle criticism of this result recently surfaced in the  
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Allison v. McGhan 
Medical Corporation.126  While adhering to the Supreme Court’s 
holding, the Allison court noted that the Supreme Court has decreed 
it is less objectionable to have judges “don[] white coats and make 
determinations that are outside their field of expertise”127 than to 
trust the communal knowledge and common sense employed by 
jurors during their deliberations.  Viewing the Daubert line of cases 
more critically, it is possible that the Court’s reasoning “reflects a 
desire to reduce case dockets and make litigation more efficient 
because judicial gate-keeping can eliminate cases at early stages in the 
litigation process and streamline those that remain.”128 
This simply cannot be what the Supreme Court intended when it 
took us down the Daubert path.  Rather, what may be at work is an 
attempt by large corporations to deflect some of society’s more 
difficult issues, such as how to deal with the harmful effects of 
products not thoroughly investigated or tested, but rushed to 
market.129 
How many lives have been potentially saved by evidence of the 
lethal dangers of asbestos revealed during the infant stages of the 
litigation twenty years ago?  How many more people would have died 
from incurable lung cancer had word of cigarettes’ carcinogenic 
propensities been withheld from the public?  Where would we be if 
incriminating expert evidence introduced in these cases had been 
subjected to a preliminary review by a trial court today?  Clearly, these 
are questions for which there is no answer. 
Furthermore, the question should be asked “where are we 
headed?”  What evidence will a plaintiff injured by toxic substances 
yet to be discovered have to establish in order to bring the 
manufacturer under the microscope?  What recourse is available to 
persons suffering from the painful symptoms of Multiple Chemical 
Sensitivity (“MCS”), whose claims have already been denied by 
overzealous gate-keepers intent on closing the admissibility gates to a 
potential mass tort should future research conclude that there is a 
 
 125 Brandon Jensen, Litigating the Crossroads Between Sweet Home and Daubert, 24 
VT. L. REV. 169, 183 (1999). 
 126 184 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 127 Id. at 1310. 
 128 See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 98, at n. 20. 
 129 See generally Mark D. Shifton, Note, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability – The ALI’s Cure for Prescription Drug Design Liability, FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2343 
(2002). 
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strong causative link?130  Where do parents of children who received 
routine vaccinations which contained the preservative Thimerosal 
and have been diagnosed as autistic go for relief for their young ones’ 
suffering?131  In the summer of 1999, the American Academy of 
Pediatrics and the U.S. Public Health Service informed these parents 
that they have concerns about ethyl mercury contained in Thimerosal 
since mercury is a toxic metal which can cause immune, sensory, 
neurological, motor and behavioral dysfunctions.132  Will their 
attempts at establishing causation also be met by locked doors? 
One thing is painfully clear: no matter how it is viewed, the deck 
is stacked against a toxic tort plaintiff seeking to introduce scientific 
and expert testimony to prove his or her injury.  As stated by 
Professor Risinger following his recent research on the issue, 
defendants win their Daubert challenges to plaintiffs’ proffers “most of 
the time” and when “defendants’ proffers are challenged by plaintiffs, 
those defendants usually win.”133 
Early in the sixteenth century, great thinkers of the Western 
World unanimously believed that the earth lay at the center of the 
universe, and all celestial bodies, including the sun and the stars, 
revolved around it.134  So deeply held was this belief, that it was 
considered heresy to think otherwise.135  But one man dared to 
believe otherwise.  Nicolaus Copernicus, sitting alone in a turret and 
using just his eyes (as telescopes would not be invented for more than 
one hundred years) sketched and re-sketched his celestial 
observations.136  As time passed, it became clear to Copernicus that 
the earth rotated on its axis once a day and traveled around the sun 
once in a year.137  For more than thirty years, Copernicus checked and 
rechecked his findings, fearful that he could be sentenced to death 
 
 130 See Admissibility of Evidence: Civil/Criminal, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. 
REP. 934, 934-35 (2002). 
 131 See Child-Vaccine Preservative Prompts Surge in Mercury-Poisoning Claims, 38-AUG 
Trial 14 (2002). 
 132 See http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vacsafe/concerns/thimerosol/default.htm (last 
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for his conclusions.138  At the insistent urging of a young German 
mathematics professor, in 1530 Copernicus published his conclusions 
in the great work De Revolutionibus.139  His research had profound 
scientific, philosophical and religious effects on the world.140  
Copernicus’s novel theories laid the groundwork for the later works 
of great scientists and astronomers including Galileo.141  It is not 
clear, however, whether his theories and research would find their 
way past the admissibility gates of an increasingly imperial judiciary 
applying a Daubert analysis. 
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 139 McWilliams, supra note 134. 
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